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Benchmarks have played a very important role in guiding the progress of computer 
science systems in various ways. Specifically, in Autonomous environments it has a 
major role to play. System crashes and software failures are a basic part of a software 
system’s life-cycle and to overcome or rather make it as less vulnerable as possible is the 
main purpose of recovery oriented computing. This is usually done by trying to reduce 
the downtime by automatically and efficiently recovering from a broad class of transient 
software failures without having to modify applications. There have been various types of 
benchmarks for recovering from a failure, but in this paper we intend to create a 
benchmark framework called the warning benchmarks to measure and evaluate the 
recovery oriented systems. It consists of the known and the unknown failures and few 
benchmark techniques which the warning benchmarks handle with the help of various 
other techniques in software fault analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
There are many reasons for having to restart software, and many ways to do it. It 
is shown from a lot of studies that the main source of downtime in large scale software 
systems is caused by intermittent or transient bugs. Some systems have a variety of ways 
to stop  - an operating system can shut down cleanly, panic, hang, crash, lose power, etc. 
When shutting down programs cleanly, there is often long wait before starting to use the 
applications again because of the time it takes to shut down and the time to come back 
up; when crash-rebooting, wait time is less and unavailability consists only of the time to 
recover. Ironically, shutting down and reinitializing can sometimes take longer than 
recovering from a crash. 
But by doing so, it might affect the system’s performance. There is always ideal 
goal of making the system perform very well and not crashing at all. It is not always 
possible but we can only try to make them better by using various techniques to make the 
system as recoverable as possible.  
The software development of a system also has effects on the system performance. 
There are some risks with them that would be a cause for the system performance to 
degrade. No software is perfect before delivering (or even after it is in the market). When 
that is the case, any software that has not been tested for errors and faults, is going to 
make the system less recoverable. A failure is a departure of system behavior in an 
execution and a fault is the defect that causes the failure when executed.  
When such failure occurs, the system or the application must be able to handle the 
failure and not bail out on it. To do that, there are many recovery processes needed and 
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benchmarks to evaluate the recovery processes.  Recovery oriented computing has helped 
in understanding the nuances of what is expected from a system when it fails and how it 
can be dealt with without affecting the performance. 
 The main challenge for recovery–oriented techniques involves knowing when 
and how frequently to try them. Although techniques such as machine learning and 
control theory can play useful roles in the future, there are ways to empower application 
writers and service operators to minimize recovery time in the face of failures. Once it is 
understood the best that can be done by these expert users and what can be learnt from 
their experiences, automating the solutions or deploying them in other systems can be 
developed. While trying to automate, it is better to avoid any human interaction because 
tools for human error recovery are not going to be possible in an automated system.  
Benchmarking [16][18][20], is another concept of comparing the current system 
to a standard and trying to equalize or outperform the standard. This is considered to be 
one of the best practices for fault tolerance and error recovery.  We have emphasized 
more on the benchmarks and different kinds of benchmarks that are used and can be used 
for recovering from a failure to make the system more robust. Availability and 
dependability benchmarks are some of the benchmarks that have been widely used for 
checking the system before delivering.  
The contribution of this thesis is a new benchmarking approach called the 
warning benchmark framework. This framework enables us to evaluate failure recovery. 
The warning benchmark framework consists of methods to evaluate the failure and once 
it is detected, recovery process begins. Most of the recovery is done using the backward 
recovery process that has been described in chapter 2. But the main focus of the research 
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is about handling the errors that are unexpected. Expected errors can be handled using 
some existing benchmarks and metrics that are very effective but there is always a trouble 
when it comes to unexpected faults. Exceptional handling is one main method for 
unexpected errors. 
An exception handling mechanism is a control structure that allows programmers 
to describe the replacement of normal program execution by exceptional execution when 
the occurrence of an exception is detected.  Unknown errors are handled using the 
warning benchmarking framework. 
Chapter 2 has the details of software metrics and fault tolerant mechanisms. 
Recovery oriented computing is explained more in detail in Chapter 3 and what a 
benchmark is and what are the types of benchmarks used is explained in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 talks about the method we intend would work for recovery using benchmarks, 












CHAPTER 2: SOFTWARE METRICS AND FAULT TOLERANCE  
 
2.1. Software metrics 
Software Engineering needs some kind of measurement at every level to make 
sure the quality is not compromised. To measure that we use metrics and in general it 
usually covers a wide range of diverse activities including Cost and effort estimation, 
Productivity measure, Quality control and assurance, Data collection, Reliability models, 
performance evaluation, Algorithmic/Computational complexity, and Structural and 
Complexity metrics. All of these are huge topic by itself. 
Of these metrics, one of the most important that would be taken into consideration 
for all Software Engineering measurement is the Cost and Effort estimation. To predict 
the project costs at the early phases in software life cycle was the aim and to do so, there 
were lot of software cost and effort estimation have been proposed and used. Some of 
them are the well known Boehm’s COCOMO model [7], Putnam’s SLIM model [8]. 
Effort in these models is measured by making the effort a predefined function of one or 
more variables (e.g. size) of the product which is defined as Lines of Code (LOC) in 
some models (COCOMO) and as Function Points (FP) in some other models. 
Data Collection [9] is considered as one of the important metric only because to 
predict and measure cost and its productivity to monitor the software process is going to 
completely depend on the Data Collection. The collection of data requires human 
observation and reporting. But this requires system analysts, programmers, testers to 
record the raw data and is not guaranteed to be correct. Automatic data capture is 
therefore desirable and sometimes very essential to record the execution time. 
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Function point analysis is another measure in software metrics. It is used instead of the 
source lines of code (SLOC) that is usually used in any software metric application. FPA 
is used to measure software effort, costs, and size. FPA can be used for estimating test 
cases, estimating overall project costs, schedule and effort, understanding the appropriate 
set of metrics. 
 
2.2. Fault Tolerance 
At every stage of developing software we encounter faults and errors. One way to 
reduce the risk of software design faults and there by enhance software dependability is 
to use Fault Tolerance techniques. This is used either in the procurement or the 
Development phase of software. The term ‘Fault Tolerance’ means it has to tolerate the 
errors or the mistakes that could happen in the system or the application during the 
development. To be able to tolerate the software faults in the system, techniques have 
been implemented to prevent system failure from occurring. Depending on the type of 
environment, fault tolerant techniques are used. The types of environment and the 
techniques [15] associated with them are – 
Single Version Software Environment [15] - This is used for partially tolerating 
the software design faults and the techniques associated are monitoring techniques, 
atomicity of actions, decision verification and exceptional Handling. 
Multiple Version Software Environment [15] – Design diverse techniques are used 
in this and they usually utilize functionally equivalent yet independently developed 
software versions to provide tolerance of software design faults. Recovery Blocks and N-
Version Programming are some of the techniques used in this environment. 
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Multiple Data Representation Environment [15] – In this, it utilizes different 
representations of input data to provide tolerance to software design faults. Retry Blocks 
and N-Copy Programming are some of the few techniques used 
 
These are the general types of fault tolerant techniques that are widely used in 
software systems and applications. Different techniques are used for different situations 
according to their needs. Some of the fault tolerant techniques that are of utmost 
importance for benchmarking will be explained in the later chapters. 
 
2.2.1. INTRODUCTION TO RECOVERY 
Error Recovery is one of the important processes in fault tolerance that has fault 
detection, error diagnosis, error containment / isolation and error recovery. Since 
recovery is the main focus, and the rest of the processes are to certain extent self 
explanatory, we will be looking more into error recovery process.  
Error recovery [23] can be done in two methods; one is forward recovery and the 
other, backward recovery [22]. This is a very broad and general way to look at any type 
of error recovery.  
 
2.2.1.1. Backward Recovery 
When the program encounters an error, it generally enters the erroneous state. The 
recovery techniques then try to return the system to an error-free state. Backward 
recovery does this by rolling back or restoring it to a previously saved state. It is assumed 
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that the previous state is error-free. If it does have an error, the same steps are repeated 
until we reach to an error free state. At every fault detection and rolling back to previous 
state, it is saved and recorded. This is called Check Pointing, and we store it in such a 
way that it is not affected by any failure. Hence upon error detection, the system is 
restored back to its previously saved error-free state [10] and then operations continue 
from there. Below is the pictorial representation of backward recovery.  
 
 
                           Figure 1:  Backward Recovery 
 
 
There are advantages to backward recovery and especially to the benchmarks that 
will be covered in future chapters, this is very important. The main advantage of 
backward recovery is that it can handle unpredictable errors [11] (if the error does not 
affect the recovery system).  This feature of backward recovery seems to be very 
important because it is possible to make any system not fail completely and abruptly. 
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Backward recovery can also be used regardless of damage in the system. It not only 
requires zero knowledge of the errors in the system, but also has a uniform pattern of 
error detection and recovery and is application independent. Backward recovery is 
particularly suited for transient errors. Once the recovery is done, the error might have 
gone for good when restarting with the checkpoint. Only considered disadvantage is that 
it requires lot of resources for the recovery and check pointing.  Implementation-wise, the 
system might have to be halted temporarily. 
Given all these points, backward recovery clearly is a fault tolerant technique that 
would be used in almost all of the software systems/applications.   
2.2.1.2. Forward Recovery  
 In forward recovery [23], it basically finds an error free state based on an 
algorithm that uses redundancy to select the correct state. All the redundant processes are 
executed in parallel and they together provide a group of acceptable state. From the 
potential results, fault detection and handling unit performs error compensation and 
derives an answer deemed acceptable.  Forward recovery is fairly efficient in terms of 
overhead and if the characteristic of faults are well understood, forward recovery can 
provide more efficient solution. Faults involving missed deadlines may be better 
recovered from using Forward recovery than by introducing delay in rolling back and 
recovering. The main drawback of forward recovery is that it is very application specific 
and it requires the knowledge of the error. There are lots of limitations to the recovery 
that it can do if it is out of the specifications. 
 Forward recovery can be done when there is need for recovery quickly and does 
not have enough time for recovering.  
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2.2.2. RECOVERY BLOCK  
Recovery block is one of the two diverse software fault tolerance techniques. It is 
also considered as a dynamic technique and the implementations were developed by 
Randell [16] and Hecht.  
Recovery block uses Acceptance Test (AT) and backward recovery to get through 
fault tolerance. Most of the program functions can be performed in more than one way 
using different algorithms and designs. All of the functions have varying degrees of 
efficiency in terms of memory management, reliability, time, complexity, etc. Recovery 
block chooses these variants such that the most efficient module is located first and is 
titled the primary try block. The less efficient variants are placed serially after the 
primary try block and are referred to as secondary or alternate try blocks. This would 
result in the graceful degradation in the performance of the variants.  
 
2.2.2.1. Recovery Block Technique 
 Recovery block implementation consists of an executive, Acceptance Test (AT), 
primary and secondary try blocks. The general Syntax is- 
  Ensure   Acceptance Test 
  By   Primary Alternate 
  Else by  Alternate 2 
  Else by  Alternate 3 
  …. 
  Else by  Alternate n 
  Else failure exception 
  Figure .2.  Recovery Block Syntax 
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In the Recovery block syntax, it will first try to ensure the AT by using the primary try 
block. If it does not pass the test, then n-1 alternates will be attempted until an alternate’s 
results pass the AT. If no alternates are successful, an error occurs.  
 
2.2.3. PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES 
Many software tolerance techniques use programming techniques. The 




Assertions are the common means of program validation and error detection.  
Randell [5] presented executable assertions as the central for the design of fault tolerant 
programs. An executable assertion is a statement that checks whether a certain condition 
holds good among the other variables and if it does not hold good, it tries to do something 
else. In simple word, it basically check the current program state to determine if it is 
corrupt by testing for out of range values , relationship between variables and  inputs and 
known corrupted states.  
Assertions may be used to only produce a warning upon detection of corrupt state 
. For example, when a corrupt state is detected, the assertion may have to halt the 
program execution or try and recover from the corrupt state.  This is completely 
application-dependant task. Traditional assertions generate warnings when the condition 
is not checked but do not try and recover. 
Recovery assertions specifically, use forward recovery mechanisms that attempt 
to replace the current corrupt state with a correct stare. In check-pointing, the entire state 
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or only specific variables can be replaced, depending on the system constraints and 
overhead involved in saving and restoring the variables or its values.  
 
Executable assertions are usually Boolean in nature and the functions are also 
Boolean, true when the condition holds well, false otherwise. 
 
 If not assertion then action 
Where assertion is a Boolean expression and action is a method or procedure. 
 
2.2.3.2. CHECKPOINTING: 
It is used in error recovery when we try to restore a previously saved state of the 
system when a failure is detected. Recovery points, points in time during the process 
execution at which the system is saved, is established. The recovery point is discarded 
when the process accepts the result and is restored when a failure is detected. 
There are mechanisms other than checkpointing for establishing the recovery 
points. Audit trails [7] and recovery cache [8] [9] are the other mechanism that can be 
used for recovery points.  In checkpointing, a complete copy of the state is saved when it 
needs to establish the recovery point. In recovery cache, it only saves the original state of 
the objects whose values change after the latest recovery point. Audit trails record all the 
changes made to the process state. There are advantages and drawbacks to each of the 
method in its own way, but checkpointing will mean combination of all the mechanism 
and will do the things that are of top priority to the system. 
The information should be stored on a stable storage so that even if node fails, the 
saved information will be safe. For a single process system, checkpointing and recovery 
is simpler than those with multiple processed and multiple nodes. 
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There are two approaches to multi-process backward recovery – asynchronous 
and synchronous checkpointing. In asynchronous checkpointing, like the name itself, 
checkpointing by different nodes in the system are not coordinated. But, sufficient 
information is maintained in the system so that when rollback and recovery is required, 
the system can be rolled back. There is the risk of unbounded rollback although the cost 
of asynchronous checkpointing is lower. Almost all of the checkpoints need to be saved 
because when there is a rollback, any remote state can be restored. The drawback of 
asynchronous checkpointing is that it can be useful only when there is a rare case of an 
expected failure and has very limited communication between the processes.  
In a synchronous checkpointing, the checkpoints are all coordinated and 
comprised of a consistent system state. Since there is a need for coordination, cost is 
more but the rollback is reduced. Unlike in the asynchronous method, only a few 
checkpoints are needed to be saved. 
 
An example of checkpointing and backward recovery technique implemented [6] in C++.  
 
  Try 
  {  
   T oldobject =object; 
   Alternate (object); 
   If (accept (object)) 
   { 
    Return; 
   } 
  } 
  Catch (…) 
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  { 
   Object = oldobject; 
   Continue; 
  } 
Figure.3. Backward recovery technique as a part of generic recovery block  
 
Another way of implementing backward recovery is by making the alternate 
return a new object than modifying the old object. But the previous method is preferred 
because it only involves initialization but this has to be initialized and assigned. It is 
preferable to save and restore the state that has changed. 
 
2.2.3.3. ATOMIC ACTIONS 
This is generally used for error recovery in concurrent systems. These systems 
must be structured in such a way that the complex asynchronous activities related to fault 
tolerance can be achieved. Quality and reusability has increased by using the atomic 
actions and also reduced the code complexity [9]. An atomic action is an action that is, 
indivisible, Serializable and recoverable. Indivisibility is the property where all the steps 
are either complete or none of them are.  
The property of atomicity is that if an action is successfully executed, its results 
and changes it made on shared data become visible. However, if it is a failure, it will 
detect the failure and return without any changes in the shared data. This enables easy 
damage containment and error handling because the fault, error propagation and error 
recovery are all in one single action. Thus, it will not cause any disruption to the other 
system activities while this is done.  
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CHAPTER 3: RECOVERY ORIENTED COMPUTING 
 
From the statistics [1] that were obtained, even with marketing campaigns 
promising 99.999% availability, well-managed servers today achieve 99.9% to 99%, or 8 
to 80 hours of downtime per year. Each hour can be costly, from $200,000 per hour for 
an Internet service like Amazon to $6,000,000 per hour for a stock brokerage firm. Total 
cost of ownership (TCO) [1] ranges from 3 to 18 times the purchase cost of many cluster-
based systems, and a third to a half of that money is spent recovering from or preparing 
for failures. We know that certain failures are inevitable and there is truly nothing much 
that can be done to eradicate them completely. But, we can definitely try to reduce the 
number of failures and bugs and not make them affect the system performance 
completely. 
It is said that in Recovery Oriented Computing (ROC) the hardware faults, 
software bugs, and operator errors are facts to be coped with, not problems to be solved. 
This is Peres’s law. In software metrics, Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) is better to look at 
rather than Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) because ROC reduces recovery time and hence 
higher availability is obtained. 
 
Recovery–oriented approaches [13][14] are usually challenging, because they 
require us to deal with cleaning up after something has already gone wrong, but it’s 
unclear and  not obvious what to clean up. For example, if there is a crash because of a 
corrupted system data structures, these should be discarded and rebuilt before continuing, 
but the application data should remain intact or worse, should be reconstructed if it has 
been damaged. Moreover, we have to be very quick in identifying what to keep, throw 
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away, or rebuild. If a decision is too difficult to automate, we must also determine what 
kind of visibility into the system and what manual-repair facilities the human operators 
charged with recovery would find most useful. 
This kind of computing is derived from autonomic computing environments, 
where everything is automated and has its own properties. Recovery oriented computing 
is autonomous in nature and possesses the same properties that autonomic computing 
[25] has; self-healing, self-configuration, self-optimization, and self-protection. On the 
whole, these features put together can be called as self-managing and systems that thrive 
on this are self managing systems. An autonomic system makes decisions on its own, 
using high-level policies; it will constantly check and optimize its status and 
automatically adapt itself to changing conditions.  
 There is a lot to ROC world and to begin with, when there were problems with the 
system performance, the concept of ACME [26] was introduced. ACME stands for 
Availability, Changeability, Maintainability and Evolutionary growth. Scalability, cost 
and performance are also incorporated into this. Since there is a problem with the system 
performance and to make sure it is not compromised, we use the properties to make the 
system more robust.  
 Previously in ACME, availability needed to be delivered to the users 24X7. 
Changeability had to support rapid deployment of new software, version control upgrades, 
new apps and user interfaces. Maintainability has to reduce burden on system 
administrators and provide helpful, forgiving system Admin environments. Evolutionary 
Growth has to allow easy system expansion over time without sacrificing availability or 
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maintainability. These were the expectations for a system to work efficiently and reduce 
the risk of failure.  
 But now-a-days in ACME, failures have become a part of life and traditional 
fault-tolerance doesn’t solve all the problems. Changeability in back-end system tiers, 
software upgrades are difficult, failure-prone or ignored. System maintenance 
environments are unforgiving and human operator error is single largest failure source. 
In evolutionary growth, evolves well in the front end but back-end scalability is difficult 
because it is operator intensive. There are statistics for such availability failures and 
causes for them.   
 Failures have become a major concern in system availability and maintenance, 
thus leading to an unreliable system. Reliability is also affected in the process. One 
leading to the other problem does not sound very good in a system. 
The quote “If a problem has no solution, it may not be a problem but a fact, not to 
be solved but to be coped with over time” by Peres is considered as a guiding proverb of 
Recovery Oriented Computing (ROC) [13]. We take errors by people, software, and 
hardware into consideration to be facts, not problems that we must solve, and fast 
recovery is how we cope with these inevitable errors. 
It is proposed and proved previously to cope with the fact and to have a graceful 
recovery when there is a failure. A widely accepted equation for system availability is 
A=MTTF/ (MTTF+MTTR), where MTTR mean time to recover after a failure and 
MTTF is mean time to Failure. Since unavailability is approximately MTTR/MTTF, 
shrinking time to recover by a factor of ten is just as valuable as stretching time to fail by 
a factor of ten. 
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 The focus is on recovery due to lot of reasons. First, we all know Human errors 
are inevitable. From the surveys that were conducted using Telephone Switched 
Networks [3] and Internet Cluster Services [2], we deduce human error as one of the 
prime reasons for focusing on recovery. Secondly, MTTR can be measured directly. 
Either number of days or number of hours, it is done directly. 
The goal of Recovery-Oriented Computing is to improve system dependability. 
To evaluate the progress in developing ROC systems and to compare the results with 
existing systems, benchmarks are used that provide a reproducible measure of system 
dependability. 
            There are some standard dependability benchmarks [27] that are developed and 
use the injection of system-level faults and perturbations to evaluate the impact of 










CHAPTER 4: BENCHMARKING 
 
Software engineering as such has lot of problems such as Traceability, Reverse 
Engineering, Concept Location, Reuse, Impact Analysis and so on. For these problems to 
arrive at a solution, the concept of benchmarking arose. Benchmarking [19] [28] has been 
used in computer science to compare the performance of computer systems like in 
Information retrieval algorithms, databases and many other technologies. Because the 
primary goal of benchmarks has always been to allow comparison of competing systems, 
benchmark design has emphasized on some features like comprehensiveness, 
repeatability, representativeness of real life situations, fairness, relevance over time, and 
independence from the specifics of the system under test. Dimensions typically measured 
are quality, time and cost. In the process of benchmarking, identifying the best algorithm 
and comparing them with the one we have is the way we learn how well the targets 
perform. 
 
There are different Types of benchmarks used for various applications. 
Depending on the application and its need, the benchmarks vary accordingly. Some of the 
benchmarks are productivity benchmarks, quality benchmarks, performance benchmarks 
[30], dependability benchmarks [31], function point analysis [29], etc. 
 
Though these are benchmarks used in various domains and are different from one 
another, the basic similarity or the basis of benchmarking concept is comparison.  
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There are types of benchmarks that we use for recovery process. 
1. Availability and Performance Benchmark. 
2. Maintenance Benchmark. 
3. Dependability Benchmark. 
 
4.1. Availability and Performance Benchmark  
The term availability has lot of interpretations. Usually, availability has been defined as a 
binary metric that describes whether a system is up or down at a one point of time. 
Further, to add to this definition it also computes the percentage of time, on average, that 
a system is available (up)—this is how availability is defined when a system is described 
as having 99.999% availability, for example.  
 Once the availability metric for a given type of system is selected, our challenge 
is to accurately measure them in a controlled benchmarking environment. But, it might be 
complicated to do this, because typical benchmark environments are explicitly designed 
to prevent the kinds of exceptional behavior that would cause availability to be affected 
in real-world systems. Hence, in order to perform availability benchmarks [32], it is 
necessary to have a benchmark environment that provides a means of generating fault-
provoking stimuli and maintenance events (human maintenance) and then test them. The 
primary technique that enables such an environment to be constructed is direct fault 
injection into the system under test. 
To build an availability benchmark, we also need a way to generate a realistic 
workload and to measure the appropriate quality of service metrics. But we can save 
some time and effort to certain extent by trusting the performance benchmarking 
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community. While they exist, we simply can use the existing performance benchmarks to 
generate a representative workload for the type of system under test, and to measure the 
desired metrics at that point of time. If the time for measurement is too small, these 
workload-generating performance benchmarks may need to be adapted to run 
continuously, repeatedly measuring the desired metric over small time periods. 
Performance benchmarks [30] have been an integral part of computer systems 
research and have addressed these issues in various ways. History has shown that 
performance benchmarks are commonly used for two purposes. They are used for 
competitive head-to head comparisons and evaluation of complete systems on full 
workloads in scenarios designed to emulate a production environment. But they are also 
used by developers and researchers who are attempting to evaluate design tradeoffs and 
measure incremental design and implementation improvements. 
 
Metrics like accuracy and completeness need to be measured and to do so, the 
system under test may also need to be modified that are generally neglected by 
performance benchmarks. Lastly, if workload induced faults such as erroneous inputs are 
to be used, the workload generator may need further modification to inject these faults at 
the appropriate time.  
Now that we have a benchmark environment that supports fault injection and a 
performance benchmark that does both work, a continuous workload generator and a 
quality of service data collector, running an availability benchmark consists of two steps. 
First, the workload generator is run without injecting faults and the desired metrics are 
recorded with the traces of the values obtained. At this, it establishes a baseline 
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measurement for a non-faulty system. Second, the workload generator is run while 
simultaneously injecting a fault workload, and again desired metrics are recorded with 
the trace of the values obtained. This step is important, since it produces a trace of the 
behavior of the system’s quality of service over time in response to various faults, which 
is the time-dependent availability metric that is we were looking for. 
There is still a challenging problem in developing benchmarks based on multi-
fault workloads that is to be human free administration for maintaining the system. How 
to realistically and reproducibly simulate the behavior of a human administrator in 
maintaining the system and in responding to failures originating from fault injection is 
the problem. Such maintenance events cannot be ignored, as very few modern systems 
are self maintaining and others will require human intervention to complete the tasks. The 
simplest solution is to run the benchmark with simulated maintenance events that 
represent correct and appropriate human maintenance actions. 
 
4.2. Maintainability Benchmarking: 
Quantifying the maintainability of a computer system is very challenging. There 
are two challenges that are particularly important and difficult. The first is that a system’s 
maintainability depends directly on the way that the system is used. Every system is 
different with respect to workload, availability requirements, and administrative policies 
between installations and all this can lead to vastly different maintainability challenges 
for the system. 
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The second challenge arises because maintainability is by default a human metric, 
which would reflect in the interaction of a human administrator’s behavior with a system 
design. Any measure of maintainability needs to capture a wide range of human factors, 
including everything from the amount of time it takes to perform maintenance, to the 
usability of the system’s administrative interface, to the psychological effects of 
complexity in a maintenance task, and to the user’s probability for causing errors.  
Furthermore, the importance and behavior of these factors can differ between 
users themselves, we know if there is a system, two different administrators will run into 
different types of problems while maintaining the system, and will draw different 
judgments about the system’s ease of maintenance. This point reflects the inherent 
variability that arises when human factors are considered. This is not an issue with 
performance benchmarks since it often attempts to strip out any potential for human 
variability. The human factors are so important in measuring maintainability that their 
accompanying variability must be accepted and incorporated into the benchmark.  
 
 The first challenge in maintainability of workload can be addressed by applying 
the ideas of application-specific benchmarking [6]. The basic concept behind application-
specific benchmarking is to characterize the system of interest along as many different 
axes as possible, producing a large set of results that capture all of the fundamental 
behaviors of the system and any important interactions between the behaviors. Once this 
system characterization has been obtained, the system’s workload is characterized in a 
similar way, by identifying and ordering the particular characterization of system 
behaviors that are relevant to the application or workload at that time. When 
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appropriately merged and distilled, these two independent characterizations produce an 
overall benchmark score that is relevant to both the system and the workload of interest. 
Though application-specific benchmarking till now has only been applied to the 
performance domain, we still think it is a good approach to use for maintainability since 
it can provide overall maintainability scores for a variety of different workloads and 
environments, while using a base system characterization that can be derived 
independently of the workload and environment.   
 
The second challenge in benchmarking maintainability [32] would be about how 
to incorporate human factors into the benchmark metrics, and techniques. One way to 
approach this challenge would be to build a model of how human administrators respond 
to system-generated stimuli while carrying out maintenance tasks, and to then apply this 
model to the various systems under test. But, this is an extremely difficult task, obviously 
because it essentially requires building an artificial intelligence that is able to handle the 
myriad unforeseen situations that arise during system maintenance. If this model is built, 
it would probably be a huge step forward in the state of the art of system maintenance, as 
the model could be used as a replacement for human administrators, instantly turning 
existing systems into futuristic self-maintaining entities.  
A much more practical approach to addressing the human challenge is to simply 
incorporate human beings into the benchmarking process. But by doing so ,it  exposes the 
human factors involved in the maintenance of a test system.  
However, using human subjects has several implications on benchmark design. 
First, it makes experiments much more labor-intensive due to the need to train, evaluate, 
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and debrief human subjects. More importantly, it requires extra care in choosing metrics 
and measurement techniques that can capture the impact of human factors while not 
being confounded by the inherent variability in behavior both across and within different 
human subjects.  
Though we know it is going to be a complex problem brining in human subjects 
to maintain, it still is going to be an option for maintaining benchmark, after all, it’s all 
developed by human.  
4.3. Dependability Benchmarking: 
 
We characterize a system’s dependability as its ability to provide the desired 
quality of service in the face of internal and external perturbations. There are some papers 
and research journals that have defined full-scale competitive benchmarks that attempt to 
fully address issues such as completeness, representativeness of real-life operational 
environments, fairness, and repeatability. Because they strive for comprehensiveness, 
these monolithic benchmarks are expensive to run. Further, certain attributes of such 
dependability benchmarks make them inherently more time consuming, and hence more 
expensive to run than that of performance benchmarks. For example, the need to inject 
and measure the effect of many different kinds of perturbations and to collect data to 
develop a realistic error model. 
 We believe that just like the case for performance benchmarks, it is important for 
developers and researchers to be able to run dependability benchmarks in-house and on a 
small scale. Since it would be used day-to-day for development and research, the 
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benchmarks must be much less expensive per run in terms of time and money than full-
scale competitive benchmarks.  
 Just like how commercial and research interest in system dependability has grown 
a lot, interest in benchmarking not just performance, but also system dependability has 
also grown quite a lot. The dependability benchmark [31] that was created basically does 
two different things: one that measures a system’s overall end-to-end dependability by 
quantifying system response to realistic injected errors, and  one that informally assesses 
particular aspects of a system’s dependability.   
There are lots of features or attributes that are closely related to dependable 
software. A benchmark on any system or software would be considered a good one if 















CHAPTER 5: PROPOSAL AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
We have seen in the previous chapters that some failures and faults are inevitable 
and to overcome them, came the benchmarking strategy. Using the benchmarks, rigorous 
testing and using various metrics makes the system or application more efficient before it 
has been delivered to the customer. However, software failures still occur during 
production runs since some bugs inevitably slip through even the strictest testing and 
benchmarks. For such situations, we use the warning benchmark framework that would 
go through the known and the unknown failure/fault phases to try and recover from the 
failure. There are some of the techniques that were used previously for different purposes 
that we will be using for this framework.  
 
The contribution of this thesis is the Warning Benchmark Framework that 
provides the following benchmarks to measure and evaluate the recoverability of 
recovery-oriented systems:   
 
1. Known Fault 
a. Unit – Testing 
b. Availability and Dependability Benchmarks 
c. Maintainability Benchmark 
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2. Unknown Fault 
a. Exception Handling 
i. Dependability cases  
b. Rest- of – unknowns 
5.1. Warning Benchmark Framework 
 
There are functional and nonfunctional faults in any system or application. We 
have seen lot of benchmarks and metrics the developers use before delivering a system or 
while developing. The warning benchmark framework that we propose comprises of 
various benchmarks and metrics put together that handle any kind of fault and failures in 
a system.  
Warning Benchmark can be broadly categorized into two sections; one is the 
anticipated or the known faults and the other being unanticipated or the unknown faults. 
5.1.1. KNOWN FAULT BENCHMARKS 
Known faults are those that the system would be prone to fail in. We have two 
most important known anticipated faults that would arise from. One is the faults or errors 
that come from Software/Hardware failures, the other being Human Error. It is a well 
known fact that these errors are inevitable and as a good developer, one must anticipate 
errors from these. As we have mentioned earlier about the different Benchmarks and 
metrics, some of them are going to be of use for this recovery oriented benchmark that 
we are going to discuss. A few metrics that we propose to be part of this Warning 
Benchmark are FPA, Complexity, and Unit Testing. 
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Anticipated errors are primarily treated by using benchmarks. Since there would 
be enough knowledge about the failure, using a benchmark that is appropriate would be 
more than sufficient for recovering. Some of the benchmarks that are useful in such cases 
are Availability and Performance benchmark, dependability benchmark and 
maintainability benchmark. Detailed explanations about these benchmarks are given in 
chapter 4. 
5.1.2. UNKNOWN FAULT BENCHMARKS- 
The second type of faults is the unanticipated faults. Exception handling is the 
only available unanticipated fault. Robust exception handling in software can improve 
software fault tolerance and fault avoidance, but no structured techniques are available 
for implementing dependable exception handling.  
5.1.2.1. Exception Handling: 
Exception handling is the method of building a system to detect and recover from 
exceptional conditions. Exceptional conditions are any unexpected occurrences that are 
not accounted for in a system's normal operation. It is difficult to protect a system from 
the effects of exceptional conditions because, by nature, all unusual occurrences cannot 
be anticipated when the system is designed. Some examples of exceptional conditions are 
incorrect inputs from the user, bit level memory or data corruption, software design 
defects that cause a system to enter an undefined state, and environmental anomalies. If 
these exceptional conditions are not properly caught and handled, they can cause an error 
or failure in the system. Failures due to exceptions are estimated to account for two thirds 
of system crashes and fifty percent of system security vulnerabilities. 
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More than two thirds of code written for systems is often devoted to properly 
detecting and handling exceptions. However, most software testing efforts focus on 
exercising the correct operation of code, and not determining how robust it is to 
exceptional conditions. Therefore, exception handling code is the least tested and most 
susceptible to bugs. [33] 
We do know it is practically impossible to handle all the exceptional cases and is 
not possible to expect the system to tolerate all the unexpected errors. To get over this 
problem, graceful degradation or some other technique is adopted to keep the system safe 
without causing major hazards. 
Programmed exception handling [34] modules are mechanisms built into software 
for specific exceptional cases that are known are likely to occur. Since these exceptional 
cases are relatively well understood, protection for them can be incorporated into the 
system. When a program is executing, if one of the exceptional conditions is detected, 
control is passed from the main process block to the special exception handling block. In 
our warning benchmark framework, it enters the unknown faults block. This code will 
deviate from normal execution to compensate for the exceptional condition and will 
attempt to mask it to prevent propagating an error condition to higher levels in the 
software hierarchy. 
If the condition cannot be recovered, the exception handler may call 
checkpointing recovery code to return the system to a known state before the exception 
occurrence and retry the operation. And once it is done guessing the exception and fails, 
it goes to the ret-of-unknown fault block and simply does the backward recovery 
irrespective of what the error might have been. 
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5.1.2.2. Exception Handling Techniques: 
 
There are many techniques to handle exceptions and some of the old and good 
software engineering techniques are code reviews, code walkthroughs, and complete 
testing, but are limited to the software of the system. 
 
Code reviews and walkthroughs are human oriented metrics that is used and still 
considered a good practice. Code reviews are done by a set or group of technically sound 
people in the relevant field. Suggestions would be made by the elate group; styles of 
programming, looks of user interface are some of the example suggestions. They tend to 
see more of the results and focus on how to make the product better.  
Walkthroughs are also human oriented; some of the good technical people are 
chosen to check the code and usually this is for finding faults with the code. It is a 
manual method of testing and finding errors through an expert in the relevant fields. 
Testing is usually adopted to make sure some of the expected errors are 
eliminated and to make them bug free. Though there are lots of types of testing, unit 
testing and integration testing are widely used for checking if there is an error in the code. 
This is obviously not manual; it is automated and has been proved to be very effective to 
certain extent for unexpected errors.  
Though there are these usual techniques for handling exceptions, there are no 
better methods for generating robust exception handlers or to ensure that all exceptions 
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have been accounted for. This has been put into the research arena and we have attempted 
to try to solve this problem.  
 
Dependability cases [4], is one of the techniques for exceptional handling that we 
are using to incorporate into the warning benchmark framework. Dependability cases 
basically are a framework by itself that has the methodologies and lists all the possible 
ways an exceptional condition might occur. Once it is listed, the system designer can use 
them as a basis for developing the exceptional handlers. Robustness of the system is 
accentuated when this is done by following good software engineering processes. 
 
 Hazard analysis techniques [4] that include fault trees and fishbone diagrams are 
also a part of the framework that helps the designer in looking for exceptional conditions. 
With this framework, exceptional conditions can be developed into an taxonomy. But, it 
is definitely impossible to find all the exceptional conditions and work on all of them and 
hence we are not so sure as to how much efficient this might be on the system. However 
good the taxonomy of exceptional conditions we develop, there are high probabilities of 
excluding a class of exceptions that will lead to system vulnerability. 
 
Though a class of exception might lead to system vulnerability, using the 
dependability cases have proved to be more efficient than before. It is proved to be 40 % 
more reliable, which is a huge difference from the previous systems.  
Hence, to make it the system as less vulnerable as possible and more efficient, 
dependability cases framework along with rest- of – unknown faults benchmark and 
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benchmark for known faults are integrated into one complete master framework, Warning 
benchmarks. 
5.2. WARNING BENCHMARK ARCHITECTURE: 
The architecture of a warning benchmark is very simple. It consists of known and 
unknown blocks. Known block contains set of benchmarks that were previously specified. 
Unknown block contains dependability cases and rest-of- unknowns. Dependability cases 
are a framework by itself and all the three blocks return to the recovery process within the 
warning benchmark.   
 
Hazard analysis helps in creative thinking about all the possible ways in which 
hazards or operating problems might arise. The technique gives new types of hazards in 
new designs, as well as hazards that have not been considered before in the checklist 
standards that were developed. Hence the basic property that hazard analysis has is the 
ability to explore all the unexpected conditions. Hazard analysis does not provide 
quantitative results but it provides us with a qualitative method of approach to the 
exception.  
Fault trees are widely used, in conjunction with hazard analysis, helps in a logical 
way, to the events leading to an exception or all of the exceptions. Fault trees are a used 
for analyzing the causes of hazards and not for identifying what the hazard is. A fault tree 
is a graphical representation that helps organize information about faults and the causes 
that lead to them. 
  To certain extent, hazard analyses and fault trees together can be used to obtain a 
reasonably clear picture of a system’s exception vulnerabilities. In the hazard analysis, it 
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generates a list of hazards to guard against, either by fault avoidance or by fault tolerance. 
A fault tree takes that list of hazards and helps to find the path to the given hazard with 
the help of the causal events or conditions. 
 Hazard analyses can be considered partially dependant on human, because the 
hazard list that is created depends on the analyst’s imagination. It is better to have prior 
knowledge of what kinds or classes of vulnerabilities to look for. For these reasons, 
having a checklist or taxonomy of exception types would be useful. 
 
 The disadvantage of using this framework and checklist of hazards in a system 
design is that lots of long lists of hazards or events are apt to go unused. They are hard to 
remember, and are very difficult to immediately get them in printed form when needed. 
To add to this, due to its huge size of data, it is difficult to reproduce them from memory, 
even if they are organized taxonomically or hierarchically. We would need a starting 
point to start using this checklist. 
  
Known faults block leads to all of the benchmarking techniques for the 
anticipated faults and the system acts according to the type of recovery process that 
benchmark specifies. Unknown faults lead to the exception handling block and tried to 
use the methods from the dependability cases to analyze and find what the error is. Once 
it is found, the recovery process for that error would be using the benchmarks specified 
for that particular error. If the error or the fault is still unknown and we cannot make the 
system wait for too long for the recovery, it goes into the newly added block in the 
warning benchmark, rest-of-unknowns, where it tries to see where the error is and it does 
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backward recovery process. This way, worst case, at least the system would not be 
damaged completely and a graceful degradation happens. It is expected to be 50% more 

























CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
We would like applications to be able to automatically recover from a variety of 
transient failures, freeing system operators to focus on higher-leverage tasks and 
requiring fewer operators to oversee larger- sized systems. 
It is unrealistic to build a system that is completely bulletproof to exceptional 
conditions because we cannot anticipate all possible situations. Therefore it is necessary 
to build in default exception handlers that will attempt to recover from any of these 
unanticipated conditions. If the application is safety critical or has real-time deadlines, 
some form of graceful degradation must be put in place to reduce the harm or damage 
done by any system failures. 
Benchmarks have been recognized for many years as an essential way to 
objectively evaluate design choices and full systems. Benchmarks were initially used 
primarily to measure and compare performance. And using such benchmarks, the system 
performance has improved tremendously. 
 
In the recent times, the focus is mainly on the recovery process. To make the 
system more robust, warning benchmark framework is introduced. It has two blocks, 
known and unknown faults and some techniques and benchmarks are used to recover 
from the failure.  In known block, availability, performance and maintainability 
benchmarks are used to recover from the failure and since they are known failures, it is 
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easy to use the appropriate benchmark. In unknown fault block, exception handling is the 
only fault tolerant technique used. It uses dependability cases to analyze the failure and 
find a way back to the cause of the failure for recovering from where it failed. If the 
dependability cases do not help in finding the fault, it traces back to a point where it is 
error free and performs backward recovery.  
 
 The contribution of this thesis is a new benchmarking approach called the 
warning benchmark framework. This framework enables us to evaluate failure recovery. 
The warning benchmark framework consists of methods to evaluate the failure detection 
and recovery process. .Using the warning benchmark framework can make the 
performance of the system better and try and avoid almost all of the error and is expected 
to be 50 % more reliable than already existing system, or worse have a graceful 
degradation. The warning benchmarks can be of very much importance for a system 
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